Redistribution and Long-Term Private Debt in Paris by Hoffman, Philip T. et al.
 Economic History Association and Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
 access to The Journal of Economic History.
http://www.jstor.org
Economic History Association
Redistribution and Long-Term Private Debt in Paris, 1660-1726 
Author(s): Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal 
Source:   The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 256-284
Published by:  on behalf of the  Cambridge University Press Economic History Association
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2123553
Accessed: 08-03-2016 20:01 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
 info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content 
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. 
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 20:01:17 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Redistribution and Long-Term Private
 Debt in Paris, 1 660-1 726
 PHILIP T. HOFFMAN, GILLES POSTEL-VINAY,
 AND JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL
 Based on a large sample from Parisian notarial records, this article examines the
 long-term private credit market in Paris in the late seventeenth and early
 eighteenth centuries and analyzes how it was affected by government-caused
 redistribution. It estimates the level of private indebtedness from 1662 to 1789,
 explains the problems the credit market faced, and determines who profited and
 who lost when government defaults, banking reforms, and currency manipula-
 tions struck private borrowers and lenders. It concludes by accounting for the
 expansion of the credit market in the last half of the eighteenth century.
 Thanks to the research of economic historians, we have a relatively
 clear portrait of financial markets in the late nineteenth century. It
 is a familiar picture of stock exchanges and of commercial and invest-
 ment banks, one that has all the clarity of a photograph. But if we look
 back further into the past, the image loses its familiarity. It blurs as
 accustomed institutions drop from view. Investment banks disappear,
 and stock exchanges, although they may exist, limit their trading to
 government bonds and stocks in semipublic government trading monop-
 olies. Credit grows increasingly personal-a merchant's iou given to a
 familiar trading partner, or a prominent financier's loan made to a king.
 At the same time, a variety of unusual financial practices come into
 view, like grotesque shapes in an ancient woodcut, and replace the
 sober and standardized procedures of the late nineteenth century. In
 eighteenth-century France, for example, it was not banks that arranged
 most loans between private parties but notaries. In England goldsmiths
 did much the same.' Governmental borrowing was just as varied.
 France borrowed short term from financiers and long term by peddling
 government offices or issuing annuities. England sold annuities too, but
 by the eighteenth century its annuities were more secure and easier to
 transfer than France' S.2 Indeed, English government loans were nearly
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 risk free and easily sold on an open market. Much the same was true
 even earlier in the Netherlands.3 By contrast, in France or Spain,
 government loans usually carried a considerable risk of default, a risk
 that would have shocked the nineteenth century.
 This picture, it should be stressed, is far from complete, at least as far
 as early modern Europe is concerned. As yet, economic historians
 cannot explain why financial practices differed so from country to
 country. They cannot answer simpler questions either, questions about
 interest and the amount of money lent. They have gathered some
 evidence about interest rates, but useable series are still rare, particu-
 larly for private loans. They know even less about the quantity of capital
 mobilized, especially on the private side. And the whole interaction
 between private and public finance remains dim as well. Historians have
 sketched the legal institutions governing private credit and highlighted
 their evolution, but they have hardly begun to trace the effect of
 government borrowing and taxation on private financial transactions.4
 Perhaps the largest expanse of empty canvas concerns long-term
 private credit. Historians know something about short-term merchant
 credit from the Middle Ages on, from medieval fairs to bills of exchange
 and the banks and exchanges that cleared merchant debt. They know
 more about government borrowing both short and long term. Private
 long-term lending, though, is still a blank before the nineteenth centu-
 ry.5
 At the time, the predominant instruments of long-term private credit
 were bills obligatory (obligations) and perpetual annuities (rentes). The
 obligations were simply ious, due in several months or years. They
 could not openly specify the payment of interest, but evidence suggests
 that it was paid on the side. The rentes, by contrast, could stipulate
 interest so long as it did not exceed a legal maximum rate. Usually, the
 rate on rentes lay below what was actually paid on obligations.6
 The other key difference between rentes and obligations involved
 repayment of the principal. With a rente, a lender surrendered his
 principal in return for a perpetual stream of fixed annual interest
 Tracy, Financial Revolution.
 4 For the legal institutions, see van der Wee, "Money"; and Schnapper, Rentes. One work that
 does explore the connection between public and private finance in pre-industrial Europe is North
 and Weingast, "Constitutions."
 s The evidence here is the relative neglect shown the chief instruments of long-term private
 credit, rentes and obligations. See, for example, Ehrenberg, Zeitalter; van der Wee, "Money";
 and Bouvier, "Vers le capitalisme bancaire." Most of what we know here comes from legal history
 or from social historians, who treat the rentes and obligations as predatory usury. For examples,
 see Schnapper, Rentes; and Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans, pp. 302-09. Recently, historians have begun
 to turn to the rentes and obligations; see, for example, Clark, "Cost"; Hoffman, Postel-Vinay, and
 Rosenthal, "Private Credit Markets" and "Economie." See also the recent colloquium on early
 modern credit reported in the November-December 1994 issue of Annales: Histoire, Sciences
 Sociales.
 6 Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets."
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 payments from the borrower and his heirs. He had no rights to demand
 repayment of the principal, and the annual payments included no
 amortization. Only if the borrower volunteered to repay the principal
 would the payments come to a halt. With an obligation, on the other
 hand, the lender demanded repayment by a certain date, and if the
 lender did not extend the loan, the borrower had to oblige.
 Anti-usury law dictated these odd restrictions, and because of them,
 one might dismiss the rentes and obligations as archaic and largely
 irrelevant to economic history. But until banks began to make long-term
 loans and stock exchanges traded private stocks and bonds, the rentes
 and obligations were the sole source of private long-term credit outside
 the family. They were the only legal way to draft long-term credit
 contracts and were quite popular.7
 Here we examine the important market for private rentes and
 obligations in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Paris. We actually
 estimate how much capital it mobilized and probe its relationship to the
 market for public credit. Throughout, our focus will be the period
 between the 1660s and the 1720s-roughly from the beginning of the
 personal reign of Louis xiv (1661) to the devastation wrought in French
 financial markets by Scottish projector and financial reformer John
 Law. We then analyze the private market for rentes and obligations and
 explain what shackled its growth. Our next task is to explore how it was
 shaken by redistribution, particularly near the end of Louis XIV's reign
 (1715) and during the Law affair (1716 to 1720). Finally, we suggest why
 it did not experience dramatic growth until well into the eighteenth
 century and how notaries became its favored intermediaries.
 LONG-TERM PRIVATE CREDIT
 The greatest obstacle confronting any study of the rentes and obliga-
 tions is the lack of centralized statistics. That is what has kept historians
 from studying long-term private credit before the nineteenth century.
 No central authority gathered figures on outstanding debt, and one
 cannot simply estimate the volume of loans by perusing the papers of a
 few giant banks, as one might for the nineteenth century. Records do
 exist, but they are scattered throughout notarial archives: it is there that
 the rente and obligation contracts lie buried, along with similar con-
 tracts for most long-term government loans.8 The notaries drew up the
 loan contracts and other essential documents, and they had the impor-
 tant task of preserving copies of the documents they recorded. They
 filed the loan contracts in chronological order in the midst of all the
 other acts they drafted-from leases and property sales to wills,
 ' Hoffman et al., "Economie."
 8 In a forthcoming book we plan to explore the institutional evolution that channelled long-term
 credit toward notaries and short-term mercantile credit along a very different path.
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 marriage contracts, and probate records. In Paris, a typical notary might
 record 500 acts per year; with nearly 120 notaries in the city the problem
 is clearly the crush of information. The real obstacle is that no
 comprehensive index exists for notarial records. There are only chro-
 nological lists, prepared separately by each notary, of the types of acts
 he recorded and the parties that were involved. There is thus no simple
 way to cull the rentes and obligations from the scores of other notarial
 acts. Nor is there an easy way to estimate the volume of lending or the
 levels of outstanding private debt. With public borrowing, one can
 consult governmental archives, for the government itself often kept
 separate accounts of the debt issued and retired. With the private rentes
 and obligations, though, the only recourse is to sample.
 In the face of such problems, we constructed indices of medium- and
 long-term private credit in Paris based on a sample of 12 notaries. We
 began by utilizing the chronological lists for the 12 notaries in the sample
 to count the number of rentes and obligations that each notary had
 recorded. Our counts extend month by month for nearly 200 years, from
 1662 to 1860, and we made similar counts of the numerous public loans
 that the notaries recorded. That yielded the number of private and
 public credit acts for the notaries in our sample, but the chronological
 lists did not mention the size of the loans. The loan sizes we estimated
 using periodic cross sections of the actual notarial acts, which also
 provided information about the duration of the loans. Multiplying the
 estimated loan sizes by the loan numbers gave us the volume of new
 loans, which evidence from other notaries allowed us to extend to Paris
 as a whole. Using information about loan durations and the frequency of
 loan repayments from the chronological lists and our information about
 loan durations, we then calculated the stock of outstanding private debt.
 The procedure, which is described in greater detail in the appendix,
 may not at first inspire much trust. But as the appendix explains, we go
 to great lengths (including taking periodic samples and counts from
 other notaries) to assure that our 12 notaries were not unusual and that
 their activity did not deviate from the norm in Paris. The resulting series
 are in fact quite robust, we would argue, and seem representative of
 Paris as a whole. That of course is important, for by the late seventeenth
 century, Paris was the financial capital of France, with Parisian notaries
 recording most acts of public credit and large numbers of private loans
 as well.9 Our series, in short, take the pulse of the biggest long-term
 capital market in all of France.
 What then do the series reveal about long-term private credit in Paris,
 particularly in the seventeenth century? If we consider the estimated
 level of outstanding private debt (all the private debt here consists of
 rentes and obligations and is calculated both in nominal terms and in
 9 Hoffman et al., "Economie."
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 FIGURE 1
 OUTSTANDING PRIVATE DEBT LEVELS IN PARIS
 Note: Nominal, real, and historical debt are defined in the text.
 Source: See the text.
 livres of constant silver value, where the livre is the French money of
 account) it clearly varied little before the eighteenth century (Figure 1).
 Stagnant over the long run in the seventeenth century, it was buffeted
 severely in the early 1700s and did not recover until the 1730s. Then the
 shape of the curve changes, and the capital market surges.
 To explain the pattern of indebtedness, one might attempt to disen-
 tangle supply and demand. Unfortunately, there is no reliable way to do
 so. We do not know the savings rate, which presumably influenced the
 supply of credit, and we lack time series of interest rates, which might
 allow us to tease out the supply and demand for loans via a clever use
 of instrumental variables. All that we do have is the level of indebted-
 ness (in other words, the quantity of loans) plus periodic observations of
 the interest rate on rentes (Table 1).
 Yet there is no reason to despair. We do know that much of the
 lending was driven by the life cycle. It revolved around older lenders
 granting loans to younger borrowers, who built houses, established
 businesses, or purchased government offices. Since nearly all of the
 borrowers came from Paris itself, we might reasonably suppose that the
 demand for credit would rise with the number of young people in Paris
 and with the return on the sort of assets that the young people would
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 TABLE 1
 CONTRACTS: LOAN SIZES AND FUNDS LENT BY INTEREST RATE
 1718-
 Interest rate (Percentage) 1662 1670 1682 1700 1720
 Percentage of Rente Contracts
 0-2 0 0 0 0 11.9
 2-4.9 1.5 7.8 16 11.2 50
 4.9-5.1 26.4 92.2 82.8 87.8 37.4
 >5.1 72.1 0 1.2 1 0.7
 Percentage of Funds Lent
 0-2 0 0 0 0 17.1
 2-4.9 3.4 18.5 38.4 26 66.2
 4.9-5.1 56.5 81.5 61.6 73.9 16.6
 >5.1 40.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.0006
 Average Loan Sizes (Livres)
 0-2 0 0 0 0 19,329
 2-4.9 11,766 8,971 12,200 10,952 17,733
 4.9-5.1 11,061 3,594 3,800 3,981 5,960
 >5.1 2,871 0 600 500 1,050
 Sample Averages
 Average loan size 5163 4017 4228 4728 13,395
 Average interest rate 5.56 4.93 4.93 4.96 4.04
 (unweighted)
 Average interest rate 5.16 4.92 4.82 4.85 3.34
 (weighted by loan size)
 Sample size 202 155 118 98 254
 Source: All surviving private rente contracts for the years in question taken from the notaries
 described in the appendix.
 eventually inherit and use to pay off their loans.10 We can fashion a
 crude measure of the number of young people from the number of
 marriages in the city. We can do the same for the return on assets using
 late eighteenth-century estimates of Parisian incomes and information
 about revenues from the government and local real estate. If we trust
 such evidence-despite all the uncertainties-then we can argue that
 demand for credit was probably stagnant or falling gradually until the
 last half of the eighteenth century, when it finally rose (Figure 2). 1
 10 For life-cycle borrowing and evidence that nearly all loans went to borrowers inside Paris, see
 Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets."
 " Decennial totals for marriages were compiled from Charlot and Dupaquier, "Mouvement
 annuel." The marriage totals were then corrected for missing months using information on
 seasonality given by Charlot and Dupaquier; the totals do not exist before 1670 or between 1685
 and 1709. The index for the income of assets began with Lavoisier's estimates for Parisian revenues
 in the late eighteenth century ("Rdsultats," pp. 437-38): 60 million livres in revenue from urban
 real estate, 100 million livres from trade and rent on farm land, and 70 million livres in net payments
 from the government. We assumed that income from trade and rent on farm land came
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 We can also make guesses about supply. In the late seventeenth and
 early eighteenth centuries, it was probably expanding, albeit slowly. If
 demand in this period was gradually falling, as seems likely, then a slight
 increase in the expansion of supply would produce both the stable
 quantity of loans we observe in Figure 1 and the lower interest rates on
 rentes that we find between 1670 and 1720 in Table 1. We can rule out
 a more dramatic expansion of supply in the late seventeenth and early
 eighteenth century, for it would be inconsistent with the stable level of
 indebtedness and with the general picture we have of the economy in the
 late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Paris was growing more
 slowly then than it would later in the eighteenth century, and the
 economy as a whole was in the doldrums. 12
 As for supply later in the eighteenth century, it must have risen at a
 much quicker pace: certainly as fast as demand and probably even
 faster. The evidence comes from interest rates, which refused to budge
 predominantly from local farm land and that net payments from the government paralleled central
 government tax receipts. We then extended Lavoisier's revenue figures backward using series of
 urban and rural rents and government tax receipts. Rents on local agricultural land were taken from
 Hoffman, "Land Rents," table 1, and those on Parisian real estate were borrowed from Ladurie
 and Couperie, "Mouvement." Central government tax receipts came from Hoffman, "Early
 Modern France," table 1. Everything was converted to livres of constant silver value to allow
 comparison with the real levels of indebtedness in Figure 1.
 12 Paris grew from perhaps 450,000 in 1650 to 570,000 in 1750, a growth rate of 0.24 percent per
 year. It jumped to 660,000 in 1790-an annual rate of 0.37 percent. The population estimates here
 come from a database provided to us by Philip Benedict; see also Benedict, "Was the Eighteenth
 Century?" One topic we shall pursue in the future is to see whether many of the lenders were
 Protestants and whether the dip in indebtedness in the late 1670s reflected growing pressure on
 them.
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 despite the run-up in the quantity of loans after 1730; indeed, real
 interest rates in all likelihood dropped. The nominal interest rate on
 rentes remained remarkably stable from 1730 on and showed no signs of
 rising as the century drew to a close.13 Given the inflation of the
 eighteenth century, real rates after 1730 had actually fallen. Lenders
 were making more loans at lower real interest rates, a clear sign of a
 surging supply of credit.
 Here one could certainly quibble. One might argue that the expansion
 of credit after 1730 came in the form of obligations, which could pay
 higher rates of interest. But the obligations only loom large at the very
 end of the century, and the level of indebtedness climbs even if they are
 ignored (Figure 3). In a similar vein, one might contend that the stability
 of the nominal interest rates on rentes after 1730 merely reflected the
 legal limit on rente interest, which remained at 5 percent for most of
 period 1730 to 1789. But evidence about rentes below the interest-rate
 ceiling belies such a claim. Had the 5 percent limit actually masked an
 increase in nominal interest rates after 1730, we would expect fewer and
 fewer rentes below 5 percent. Yet in a sample of rentes from the years
 1730 to 1789, the fraction paying less than 4.9 percent interest was 11.4
 13 Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets," table 4.
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 percent, and 25.1 percent of the funds lent went at these low interest
 rates.14 The percentages are essentially the same as in 1670 to 1700,
 despite the surge of lending (Table 1). True, nominal rates did dip lower
 still in the years 1718 to 1720, but as we shall see, these were exceptional
 years when John Law and the government were trying to push interest
 rates down. They were not the norm.
 What then caused the supply of credit to grow so dramatically after
 1730? What slowed its growth in preceding years? And what caused
 indebtedness as a whole to plummet at the end of Louis XIV's reign?
 Without precise estimates of supply and demand, we cannot give
 absolute answers to these questions. We cannot rule out some myste-
 rious variation in savings rates, for instance. Yet we can tell a
 convincing story and rule out several alternative explanations. As far as
 the expansion of credit in the late eighteenth century is concerned, for
 instance, we cannot turn to the old argument that the money supply
 suddenly began to grow, for recent figures suggest that the supply of
 bullion was in fact expanding in the late seventeenth century as well. 15
 Nor can we invoke a sudden influx of foreign capital: in the eighteenth
 century, as in the seventeenth, funds for long-term private credit came
 overwhelmingly from within France.16 And obviously the late eigh-
 teenth century did not suddenly bring scores of banks into the world.
 A more convincing explanation lies with the problems faced by the
 seventeenth-century credit market. They suggest what restricted the
 supply of credit before the 1730s and what fed its growth thereafter.
 Among the problems perhaps the most serious-and the most important
 for our purposes-was determining whether a borrower could provide
 secure collateral. Long-term loans (and especially perpetual annuities,
 which constituted the bulk of long-term private debt in the seventeenth
 century) required sound collateral. A borrower might offer specific
 assets or a general claim on all of his property, but what lenders
 preferred was extensive real property-land and buildings but also
 government offices and even other rentes. It is no surprise then that
 most loans went to wealthy nobles and offcers (Table 2). They had the
 real property that would best guarantee a loan.
 The difficulty-as always in credit markets-was that a lender could
 14 The 1730-1789 sample is described in Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets."
 15 De Vries, Economy, pp. 20-23; Morineau, "D'Amsterdam A Seville" and Incroyables
 gazettes; and Glassman and Redish, "New Estimates."
 16 Our notaries left behind the records of 367 loans in 1662, all of them private. Of the lenders,
 only one was a foreigner, and he furnished only 0.21 percent of the total money lent. Samples from
 the eighteenth century yield similar results: 0.60 percent of private lenders were foreigners from
 1726-1789, and 0.88 percent from 1751-1789. The fraction of money lent was equally small. For the
 eighteenth-century samples, see Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets." In public credit
 markets, by contrast, foreigners were quite active, just as they were in short-term merchant credit,
 but even then only after the 1740s. See Luthy, Banque protestante. One might argue that the influx
 of foreigners in the public market would release capital for private loans, but the private market is
 simply too large for this to have been the case.
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 TABLE 2
 PROFESSIONS OF PRIVATE BORROWERS AND LENDERS, 1662
 Private Lenders Private Borrowers
 Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of
 Social Group Contracts Funds Lent Contracts Funds Lent
 Nobles and officers 43.1 68.8 44.5 74.3
 Clergy 5.2 8.5 3.3 2.5
 Merchants and bourgeois 27.8 15.2 21.9 11.7
 Artisans and masters 11.4 4.6 9 4.1
 Professions and independent 7.1 1.2 8.7 4
 commerce
 Rural 1.4 0.3 10.9 1.2
 Unknown and institutions 4.1 1.3 1.6 2.2
 Note: Nobles include military officers. Professions and independent commerce include lawyers,
 doctors, inn-keepers, transporters, and domestics, who in 1662 were generally well-paid servants
 in noble households. Because of rounding, columns do not sum to 100. There were 367 credit
 contracts in all.
 Source: All surviving private credit contracts from 1662 for the notaries are described in the
 appendix.
 not easily observe dealings by a borrower that undermined the value of
 the collateral and the security of the loan. The collateral might already
 be mortgaged, and in the case of a bankruptcy, the lender might receive
 only a pittance after lenders with senior mortgages had been paid.
 Furthermore, there was no easy way to determine whether property had
 already been mortgaged, for the earlier mortgage remained a secret
 between the borrower and the earlier lender. A lender who wished to
 make a second loan might thus remain unaware of the first mortgage
 unless he knew the first lender well. Contemporaries were fully aware of
 the dilemma, and to resolve matters, a 1673 edict sought to create a
 system of public registration for mortgages. The stated purpose was to
 render it "possible to make loans with assurance. . . . Creditors will be
 certain about a debtor's wealth. No longer will they fear that his
 holdings will decline in value, and no longer will they anxiously watch
 over his assets." 17 The edict, though, was revoked only a year later.
 Perhaps it succumbed to the difficulties of establishing new institutions.
 Or perhaps it fell victim to the contemporary argument that a registry,
 by revealing the vagaries of private fortunes, would actually destroy the
 existing system of access to private credit, which was based on a
 lender's personal knowledge and "opinion" of a borrower and the
 borrower's "reputation. " 18
 A mortgage registry was in fact created for government offices
 pledged as collateral, but for most private property there was no way of
 17 Clement, Lettres, pp. 332-33; Isambert, Recueil gen&ral, vol. 19, pp. 73-86. Another reason
 for the legislation was to facilitate sales, and a fiscal motive may have been lurking in the
 background as well.
 18 D'Aguesseau, Oeuvres, pp. 620-23.
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 knowing whether it had previously been mortgaged.19 Nor was there
 any way of preventing a borrower or his heirs from selling part of the
 mortgaged collateral without the lender's knowledge-an obvious risk
 with the perpetual annuities. An aggrieved lender could certainly sue
 and even pursue the purchaser of the mortgaged collateral for a portion
 of the interest due. Courts, though, were quite expensive, and despite a
 seemingly favorable legal position, the lender risked getting bogged
 down in interminable litigation, for the purchaser of the mortgaged
 collateral could tie up the legal proceedings by going after the seller of
 the collateral. Nor were these simply theoretical complications. In the
 late sixteenth century, the Wars of Religion had devastated so many
 borrowers and crushed so much collateral under multiple mortgages
 that the noted jurist Charles Loyseau judged rentes to be little more than
 a "will o' wisp right, at bottom just a fragment of parchment." Loyseau
 was grasping for rhetorical effect, but there is no denying the reality of
 the problem.20
 There were still other risks that a borrower might present. Like many
 tax farmers and financial officials, he might be engaged in what was
 known asfinance: he might be borrowing privately and then relending to
 the state. That was the source of much of the state's short-term debt,
 particularly in times of war. The trouble, though, was that such
 financiers were often compromised during the government's recurrent
 financial debacles.27 Afinancier might, for instance, be brought up short
 by one of the government's frequent defaults. Or worst of all, he might
 become the target of a chambre de justice, a judicial investigation that
 could single out financiers and tax them to the point of ruin. That was
 the fate, for example, of the tax farmer Francois Bossuet; in the early
 1660s, a chambre de justice seized all of his assets.22 In cases such as
 Bossuet's (or in instances when the state defaulted), the financier's
 private creditors watched their loans sour or had to contend with the
 state's own claims to the financier's assets.23 How widespread such
 predicaments were we can only guess, for many of the private loans to
 financiers were short-term affairs that have left no trace in the archives.
 Daniel Dessert has argued that private loans to financiers were quite
 common in the seventeenth century, and it is perhaps symptomatic that
 in the years 1665 to 1673 the Crown moderated its claims onfinanciers'
 assets in order to protect the financiers' own private credit. In any
 19 Bien, "Offices"; and Vilar-Berrogain, Guide. It was also possible to keep track of mortgages
 on certain government rentes. See Isambert, Recueil general, vol. 19, pp. 83-86.
 20 Loyseau, Traictes; Schnapper, Rentes, pp. 119-29, 261-80; Dewald, Formation, pp. 232-33;
 Guyot, Re6pertoire, s.v. "Hypoth6que" and "Rente."
 21 Dessert, Argent, pp. 128-29. Some 18 percent of Dessert'sfinanciers went bankrupt; he argues
 that the true bankruptcy rate was in fact higher, on the order of 20 to 25 percent during afinancier's
 career.
 22 Ibid., pp. 205-06, 743, 771.
 23 Ibid., pp. 124, 143.
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 event, it would be difficult to predict whether a particularfinancier was
 likely to run into trouble. The state's defaults were selective, often
 depending not just on the costs of war but on personal politics. And a
 chambre de justice could punish a seemingly prosperous financier for
 government business he had carried out years earlier.24
 The state's currency manipulations posed an even greater threat to
 lenders. Repeatedly the state changed the value of coinage, by fixing a
 new bullion equivalent for the legal money of account and requiring
 coins to be reminted. It did so both to profit from mint fees and (since
 the usual course of action was devaluation) to repay its own debts in
 depreciated money of account.25 The effect on private credit markets
 was severe. In the first place, by the late seventeenth century it was not
 licit for a rente contract to require in-kind payments of interest. Nor
 could a rente or an obligation specify payments of a fixed amount of
 specie, at least in the period that interests us; in any event, by the 1660s
 both instruments were always stipulated in money of account.26 As a
 result, parties to long-term private credit contracts had no way to escape
 the effects of currency manipulation. And because devaluation was the
 most likely course of action, it was lenders who shouldered the greatest
 risk.
 As usual, the dangers confronting lenders forced them to charge a risk
 premium and to vary the interest rate according to the dangers each
 borrower posed. Such variation in interest rates was precisely what
 characterized the seventeenth-century rentes (Table 1). With the obli-
 gations, where interest rates were not explicitly mentioned, the charges
 were probably higher still. There was of course the legal limit to the
 interest rate that could be charged in private rentes: 5.56 percent in the
 early 1660s, and 5 percent or less thereafter.27 The law undoubtedly led
 24 Ibid., pp. 203-10, 239-41, 266-70, 341-68, 743, 750, 771; Bosher, "Chambres de justice"; and
 Hoffman, "Early Modem France." In addition to the chambres dejustice themselves, there were
 legal proceedings against individualfinanciers, and the threat of a chambre dejustice could be used
 to extort money fromfinanciers, as in the period 1656-1661.
 25 We do not deny that devaluation often aimed to address problems of chronic undervaluation
 of coinage. See Glassman and Redish, "Currency Depreciation." But for our period-and in
 particular, for the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century-it was the fiscal motive that was
 paramount, at least in France.
 26 Isambert, Recueil ge6neral, vol. 15, pp. 270-76 (Edit sur les monnaies, 1602). For the
 complicated legal history, see Schnapper, Rentes, pp. 175-200.
 27 An edict of September 1679 did raise the limit back to 5.56 percent, but it is not clear that it
 took effect. See Isambert, Recueil general, vol. 19, p. 217. Although one could conceivably evade
 the interest rate limit on rentes, it was probably not a common practice. The limit was usually set
 just above the prevailing market rate on rentes, and on the rare occasions when it suddenly dropped
 enough to constrain the prevailing rate, people stopped using rentes. If evasion had been common,
 they presumably would have continued right along. See Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets."
 Furthermore, it was difficult for a borrower and lender to collude in evading the limit because
 unlike an obligation, a rente might continue forever. A borrower might agree, for instance, to pay
 additional interest on the side, but his heirs could renege. Another strategy-having the lender give
 the borrower only part of the principal-was difficult too, for it required the collusion of the notary,
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 to credit rationing, but even without a legal bound on interest rates, we
 would expect credit to be restricted by the value of a borrower's
 collateral. The real difficulty was ascertaining what the collateral would
 actually be worth in the case of default. Would it turn out to be
 overburdened with senior mortgages? Would the borrower try to peddle
 it on the sly? Would it end up devoured by law suits and a horde of
 ravenous creditors? Most important of all, what was the likelihood of
 the borrower's default?
 The solution here was to watch the borrower closely or know him
 well. One tactic-possible only with obligations-was to require repay-
 ment of the loan at the lender's first request, a request that would
 undoubtedly be made at the earliest sign of a borrower's difficulties. The
 tactic was probably a sign that the lender was keeping the borrower
 under surveillance. It was quite common for smaller obligations, most
 likely where the loan was risky.28 Alternatively, it might signal to the
 lender that the loan posed no threat to the borrower's liquidity. A
 borrower's willingness to take on such a loan would reassure a hesitant
 lender.
 The same tactic was not available for rentes, for there (as we know)
 lenders could not demand repayment. With rentes, lenders tended to
 restrict their loans to borrowers they knew well such as family mem-
 bers, neighbors, professional colleagues, or those whom they could
 trust and whose collateral was in their view. They did much the same
 with obligations. In 1662, 45 percent of the loans (both rentes and
 obligations) that our notaries recorded involved borrowers and lenders
 drawn from the same family, neighborhood, or profession (Figure 4).29
 Such personal ties were more common still if we leave out short-term
 obligations that the notaries rarely preserved-the brevets. Even these
 almost always brought together parties who were well acquainted, such
 as an artisan and one of his clients.30 And if we consider only loans
 involving Parisians, the frequency of the personal links rises higher still.
 who was supposed to witness the transfer of the entire principal. See Guyot, Repertoire, s.v.
 "Rente" and "Inter&s."
 28 In our samples, obligations demanding repayment at the lender's first request averaged 977
 livres in 1670 versus 3,396 livres for those with a stipulated duration. In 1682, the first-request
 obligations averaged 1,608 livres versus 2,962 livres for those with explicit durations.
 29 The evidence comes from a reading of all 367 loan contracts that survive for our sample in
 1662. Here and below, same family means that the borrower and lender are related by marriage or
 by blood. Same neighborhood means the same parish within Paris and the same department outside
 Paris. Persons from departments near Paris (the old departments of the Seine and the Seine-et-
 Oise) were excluded from the comparison, as were individuals whose residences could not be
 pinned down to a parish in Paris or a department outside the city.
 30 For examples, see France, Archives Nationales, Minutier Central (hereafter AN MC), Etude
 CXV, 199. The obligations en brevet were rapidly repaid: within 0.68 years in 1670 (versus 1.15
 years for obligations with a specified duration) and 0.47 years in 1682 (versus 1.36 years). They
 were really not long-term loans at all. Rather, they were short-term credit in an era before the
 complete development of a commercial code.
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 FIGURE 4
 PERSONAL LINKS IN PRIVATE CREDIT: FAMILY, PROFESSION,
 OR NEIGHBORHOOD
 Note: Loans from the years 1718-1720 have been lumped together here to form one cross section.
 Source: All surviving loans in our sample of notaries for the years 1662, 1700, 1718-1720, 1740, and
 1780.
 Defining a personal tie is, to be sure, a bit arbitrary. But whatever the
 precise definition, lenders who relied on personal knowledge of borrow-
 ers were more numerous in 1662 than in the eighteenth century, and the
 difference is too large to be explained by chance (Figure 4).31 Even
 where no personal bond was evident, lenders were likely to have links
 to a borrower.32 They limited their loans to relatives, neighbors,
 professional associates, and other close acquaintances. The practice
 reflected the difficulties of observing a borrower's actions and of
 verifying his collateral. The result was to restrict credit, at least relative
 to the eighteenth century, when lending gradually escaped the bonds of
 personal relations. Perhaps the long-term private capital market would
 have flourished earlier had there been an institution that reduced the
 risks: specialized loan brokers, public registration of mortgages, or
 banks that would pool lenders' funds. It might have flourished too had
 the state not compounded the risks by manipulating the currency and
 bullying its own creditors. But as we shall see, the appropriate institu-
 tions did not yet exist, and the state's vicious behavior was inherent in
 the politics of the seventeenth century.
 31 A logit analysis shows that the greater frequency of personal ties in 1662 was not likely to be
 a chance result. The evidence here comes from a detailed reading of all surviving credit contracts
 in our sample for 1662, 1700, 1718-1720, 1740, and 1780.
 32 The tax farmer Francois Bossuet borrowed, for example, from the tuteur of a relative's
 children: AN MC, Etude CXV, 159 (23 October 1662).
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 THE IMPACT OF REDISTRIBUTION
 Under Louis XIV, the monarchy disrupted both public and private
 finance, leaving behind both winners and losers. To sift winners from
 losers, we should first determine how the Crown affected different credit
 markets and then trace social profiles of the various lender and borrower
 pools. Yet some of the king's actions had more subtle effects on capital
 markets, for their incidence varied with risk or loan size. Moreover,
 because the monarchy intervened repeatedly in capital markets, bor-
 rowers and lenders formed expectations about redistribution, expecta-
 tions that must be taken into account. Accordingly, we begin by
 sketching the Crown's tactics. We next examine the results of royal
 policy and determine how different social groups fared. Then, after
 summarizing the tumultuous history of the Law affair, we analyze
 state-driven redistribution through the lens of rational expectations.
 Methods of Redistribution
 Louis XIV's personal reign began in 1661 with a decision that
 exemplified the Crown's ruthlessness: Louis XIV arrested his superin-
 tendent of finance, Nicolas Foucquet, on charges of treason and
 corruption. Louis then put Foucquet and other majorfinanciers on trial
 in a chambre de justice, which used heavy fines to redistribute income
 from thefinanciers to the monarchy. But the chambre dejustice was but
 one weapon in Louis XIV's arsenal, an arsenal to which he repeatedly
 returned. The problem was that the king loved the glory of war, but
 when war came, as it frequently did in early modern Europe, it boosted
 his expenses and debts dramatically. The obvious solution-raising
 taxes to match expenses-was beyond even Louis XIV's reach. As a
 result, the Crown (and not just under Louis XIV) cut its debts
 unilaterally, particularly those incurred in wartime. Whereas its strategy
 was, broadly speaking, one of selective default, its tactics reached well
 beyond merely stopping payments on loans. Indeed, it preyed upon
 capital markets, both public and private, in a variety of ways.
 Our focus are the royal policies that affected the long-term market,
 beginning with the monarchy's attitude towards its own long-term debt.
 The Crown financed its activities with a mix of short-term and long-term
 debt. When the short-term debt grew too large, the monarchy trans-
 formed part of it into long-term debt through a process of conversion
 that could be either voluntary or forced. In a voluntary conversion, the
 Crown floated bonds in the long-term market and used the proceeds to
 retire short-term debt. But voluntary conversion supposed that the
 monarchy had access to a cheap supply of long-term funds. When cheap
 long-term financing was unavailable, the Crown was tempted to force a
 conversion, as it did in 1698, 1714, and 1720. In each of these instances,
 the monarchy established a schedule telling how short-term debt would
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 be converted into long, a schedule that cut both interest and principal.
 Because the Crown created the schedule, it could discriminate among
 different classes of creditors. Usually it singled out creditors who held
 large amounts of government debt and who had bought it on the
 secondary market, creditors who were typicallyfinanciers. Yet another
 possibility was political discrimination-offering different terms to those
 it sought to protect. Obviously, the chambres de justice (tried both in
 the years 1661 to 1669 and 1716 to 1717) were an extreme form of
 involuntary conversion. Yet after 1669, conversion most often took the
 form of a visa in which holders tendered their short-term paper to
 officials and were given long-term bonds in return.33
 The forced conversions of the king's short-term debt amounted to
 default. Although the defaults on the short-term debt were more severe,
 those affecting the king's long-term loans were also quite significant.
 Historically, the Crown borrowed at relatively high rates in wartime and
 then unilaterally reduced the interest payments when peace was re-
 stored.34 After 1688 the monarchy was forced to pay more than 5.56
 percent or more for its long-term debt (rentes), but with the coming of
 peace in 1698 it quickly moved to lower interest payments to 5.55
 percent and then to 5 percent in 1700. When war resumed in 1701, the
 Crown again offered interest rates of 5.56 to 6.25 percent to new
 creditors. After the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, it reduced payments to 4
 percent. In this case again, the monarchy would often treat secondary
 holders of debt (again, often financiers) more harshly than initial
 purchasers, and there were often rumors of protection for the politically
 powerful.35
 The defaults and conversions concerned the market for government
 debt, but the Crown's desperate need for funds made private credit
 markets an inevitable target as well. Attacking private markets had two
 advantages. In the first place, it aggravated the uncertainty private
 lenders faced, thereby reducing the relative risk premium the Crown
 had to pay because of its sordid history as a borrower. Assaulting
 private markets also raised revenues directly, and it had the distinct
 advantage of taking money from the pockets of nobles and other
 privileged individuals who were exempt from most taxation. Striking
 private capital, though, exacted a high cost, for it sapped the financial
 market and, in the long run, the economy as a whole.
 33 The idea that political connections were crucial is the theme of Dessert, Argent. Although it
 is likely that short-term government finance speculation depended in large part on inside
 information and political connections, the visas tended to be more uniform.
 34 Antonetti, "Colbert."
 35 The data that we have cannot speak to the issue of preferential treatment since it does not
 allow us to follow individual portfolios over time. While preferential treatment in the short-term
 market seems fairly clear (see, for instance, Luthy, Banque protestante, pp. 286, 333) it is much
 harder to establish in the case of long-term debt. One of the rare examples involves the annuities
 to the Queen of Poland that escaped default in 1700. See Shakespeare, France.
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 The Crown hit private capital markets with two weapons: interest-
 rate regulations and monetary manipulations. The first weapon made it
 easier for royal debt to compete with private debt by reducing the
 maximum interest that could be paid on perpetual annuities. The
 monarchy progressively lowered the ceiling from above 7 percent to 5
 percent between 1601 and 1665. Cutting the maximum interest rate,
 though, had little effects on either revenues or the debt in the short run,
 all the more so since the cuts usually applied only to new rentes and
 often came at a time when interest rates were declining anyway. More
 dramatic results required the second and more drastic weapon of
 monetary manipulations. It was an obvious option, with an immediate
 benefit for the Crown and for every other debtor as well. It allowed the
 monarchy to appropriate revenue both from its creditors and from
 holders of specie. As we know, the redistribution then spilled over into
 the private sector (in the 1690s, for example) because it was illegal to
 specify notarized debt contracts in anything other than the unit of
 account (Figure 1).
 The final flurry of royal attacks deserves special mention. Between
 the end of the War of Spanish Succession in September 1713 and the end
 of 1726, the Crown pulled out every arm from its arsenal, over and over
 again. In 1713 to 1714 and 1721 to 1722 it cut interest payments on the
 long-term debt by fiat. At the same time it consolidated short-term debts
 in two visa operations, and it subjected financiers to a chambre de
 justice in 1716. It devalued the currency in 1714 and again in 1726.
 Finally, between October 1719 and October 1720, it introduced pure
 paper money, which depreciated rapidly. Sadly, this barrage of inter-
 vention destroyed the existing long-term financial system, cutting
 private debt level significantly and public debt even more: the cost of
 public-debt service plunged by at least 50 percent.
 Redistribution in the Public Market
 Who then bore the brunt of the monarchy's defaults and predatory
 attacks? Financiers obviously, but who else? The problem is compli-
 cated by the lack of information available to most contemporaries about
 the identity of the likely victims. It is thus difficult to say what actions
 individuals could take to shield themselves. It must have been obvious
 that periodic defaults were inevitable. Equally clear was the connection
 between the end of warfare and the restructuring of the debt. Yet at the
 same time the Crown provided little information about the state of its
 finances, and it had great leeway in selecting its victims. Although in the
 aggregate people knew that a default was coming, its precise incidence
 was always somewhat of a surprise for most individuals. Moreover, our
 sources do not reveal what precautions people took to protect them-
 selves.
 If we consider first the short-term government debt-a murky area
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 where systematic records are lacking-then it is likely that financiers
 were the most- concerned. They held enormous amounts of it, particu-
 larly at war's end, when the threat of government intervention peaked.
 True, those who escaped attack could convert their short-term debt into
 more secure land and offices. But even then they were not perfectly
 secure, for a chambre de justice (or the threat of one) might mean a
 heavy fine that would force them to sell their property. Their involve-
 ment in this risky arena of short-term finance probably explains the high
 rate of bankruptcy among seventeenth-century financiers-perhaps as
 high as 25 percent.36 The rate of bankruptcy justifies at least in part the
 high premiums that they charged for their services.
 On the other hand, the financiers were hardly naive. They knew the
 details of government operations and were compensated by high inter-
 est rates. Whereas somefinanciers clearly suffered, others profited-the
 brothers Paris, for instance, who administered the visa of 1721 to 1723.
 As far as the short-term debt was concerned, the defaults thus redis-
 tributed a certain amount of wealth not just from the financiers to the
 Crown but among the financiers themselves. How much we cannot say.
 About the long-term government debt we can say much more. It was
 in any case the bulk of the state's borrowing, and those who held it lost
 enormously in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.37
 Who were these unfortunate souls? If we examine our samples from
 1682, 1700, and 1711, a striking phenomenon emerges. In the late
 seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the social and political elites
 held the bulk of the debt. If we define the elites to be the nobles, officers,
 and clergy, then they held in excess of 65 percent of the king's bonds in
 1682 and even more in 1700. They did subscribe significantly less of the
 issue of 1711, probably because the elite was by then too heavily
 invested in government debt, forcing the Crown to seek other lenders
 (Table 3).38 In any case, what matters for studying redistribution is the
 totality of the debt, not just unusual bonds of recent issue. The samples
 from 1682 and 1700 are thus more likely to represent the bulk of the
 monarchy's creditors, suggesting that the great losers were the elites.
 Clearly, the government's defaults shifted wealth from privileged
 elites to the Crown. Exempt from much taxation and profiting from the
 state's largess, the elites nonetheless paid by the late 1600s and did so
 via default.39 Earlier, the monarchy had shielded politically sensitive
 36 Dessert, Argent, pp. 124-25, 128-29, 143-44. According to Dessert, at the time of the chambre
 de justice in 1716, nearly 45 percent of financiers had more than 75 percent of their fortune in
 "portefeuille," most of that being short-term government debt.
 37 Between 1698 and 1722 individual bonds lost more than half of their face value. In the 1690s
 bonds were issued at above 5 percent, and by 1722 no government bond paid more than 2 percent.
 38 It is also possible, though not likely, that 1711 was peculiar because it was a forced loan. See
 Dessert, Argent, pp. 21, 708.
 39 Many of the state's other creditors in Table 3 were privileged as well-bourgeois de Paris, for
 instance, who were exempt from the taille.
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 TABLE 3
 PROFESSIONS OF GOVERNMENT LENDERS, 1662-1711
 (percentages)
 1682 1700 1711
 Funds Funds Funds
 Social Group Contracts Lent Contracts Lent Contracts Lent
 Nobles and officers 44.5 61.2 47.2 57.9 37.6 35.8
 Clergy 5.7 4.6 9.2 8.8 3.3 2.9
 Merchants and 24.8 18.1 22.3 16.8 33.3 26.6
 bourgeois
 Artisans and masters 3.5 2 5.4 3.6 8 11.6
 Professions and independent 3.8 2.8 4.1 2.7 6.1 11.1
 commerce
 Rural 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0
 Unknown and 17.5 11.1 11.6 10 11.8 12.1
 institutions
 Note: Professions are as in Table 2. Columns may not sum to 100 because of rounding. There were
 924 contracts for 1682, 2,138 for 1700, and 213 for 1711.
 Source: All surviving government loans from 1682, 1700, and 1711 are from the notaries described
 in the Appendix.
 groups who held state debt. When its defaults hit creditors who were too
 powerful-as in 1648 at the beginning of the revolt known as the
 Fronde-it eventually recoiled.40 But by the end of the seventeenth
 century its defaults struck nearly all the holders of the same long-term
 bonds the same devastating blow.41 The novel procedure reflected
 Louis XIV's long-term success at suppressing revolts, success that
 rendered far less likely the sort of challenge to default that had marked
 the Fronde. A more immediate concern was also apparent, for at the
 close of Louis XIV's reign the desperate state of the treasury ruled out
 more selective tactics. The Crown simply could not spare sensitive
 groups who possessed much of the nation's financial wealth. Had it
 sheltered them, it could not have reduced its debt. Unable to tax them,
 it grabbed their money anyway via default, and default became a
 tempting way to siphon money from the tax exempt.42
 For their part, the privileged were undoubtedly aware of the risk. Yet
 they lent to the state and did so willingly-after all they could always
 place their money in the private market, where (at least in the seven-
 teenth century) essentially the same credit instruments were available.
 That they voluntarily invested in government debt suggests that they
 were compensated in advance for the defaults via a risk premium, which
 I Bonney, King's Debts; and Hoffman, "Early Modem France."
 41 In the conversion of 1698, all bonds were reduced to 1/18. Since 1682 the crown had marketed
 bonds at 1/20, 1/18, 1/16, and 1/14; how much of a cut individuals received depended on when they
 invested. See Shakespeare, France.
 42 Here there is not enough space to address the complicated question of the distortions caused
 by such a tax on the privileged.
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 explained why the monarchy borrowed more dearly than private
 debtors.4
 Redistribution in the Private Market
 Elites were not the only group affected by government action.
 Monetary manipulations cut the value of the livre by more than 40
 percent between 1690 and 1726, redistributing wealth from creditors to
 all those who owed livres, not just the Crown." Precisely who lost the
 most is not always clear. In the short-term private market, for instance,
 we are left to grope in the dark, for some short-term credit was
 undoubtedly stipulated in specie and so unaffected. And in the long-
 term private market, the losses must be attributed individual by
 individual rather than by social class. Indeed net interclass capital flows
 in the private market were a small fraction of total activity. The
 elites-nobles, officers, and clergy-probably borrowed about as much
 as they lent in the private market, leaving them all about even (Table 2).
 If we take the state's debt into account, though, then the elites were
 probably net lenders, for the state ran a steady deficit and the elites
 owned the bulk of the state debt. Here the elites clearly suffered as
 Louis XIV's reign came to a close. The greatest harm was probably
 done to single women and the aged-members of the elite far more
 likely to lend than to borrow.45
 The one measure that left the elites relatively unscathed was the
 interest-rate cap. Although the elites were in all likelihood net lenders,
 many of their loans were made to the state and were unaffected by the
 cap. As for their private rentes, a good portion of them were made to
 other members of the elite, often at rates well below the 5 percent cap
 that generally prevailed after 1665. The low interest rates were partic-
 ularly true of the large loans that only the privileged could arrange
 (Table 1).
 Other urban groups were perhaps more sensitive both to monetary
 manipulations and to variations in the interest-rate cap. Some, such as
 the merchants and bourgeois, were net lenders in the private market.
 When the Crown lowered the value of the livre, part of their savings
 went up in smoke. Fortunately, they rarely had much of their fortune
 invested in long-term financial instruments. In this, they resembled the
 elites and indeed all social groups except forfinanciers. Elite fortunes,
 for instance, have been studied in considerable detail, and it was rare
 that members of the elite put more than 10 percent of their wealth in
 4 Martin and Bezangon, Histoire; and Hoffman, "Early Modern France."
 44 Obviously, holders of precious metal could realize a profit from the devaluation, by having
 their coins reminted. But since the stock of metal was probably small relative to total debt, we
 neglect this aspect.
 45 Hoffman et al., "Private Credit Markets." The evidence here is from the eighteenth century,
 but there is no reason to believe that the patterns in the seventeenth century were different.
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 debt contracts-the financiers again being the major exception. The
 impact of royal default was thus muted. Here though we have an
 explanation for the long-standing predilection for real estate shown by
 French elites and other social groups. Its roots lay not in some dark
 swamp of cultural forces but rather in the need to blunt monetary
 manipulations .46
 Merchant and bourgeois lenders did suffer more from interest-rate
 legislation, for a greater portion of their loans carried high interest rates
 and would thus be constrained by the legislation. The tiny fraction of
 loans that were contracted above the legal rate suggests that the
 legislation was quite effective at limiting interest rates on rentes. Here it
 is worth noting that the 5 percent cap imposed in 1665 did not
 immediately give rise to financial instruments less constraining than the
 rente. That transition had to await the 1750s-nearly a full century later.
 The Crown's tactics affected one final set of credit relations: those
 linking the city and the countryside. Urban dwellers owned a good deal
 of rural land, and capital flowed from the city to countryside, as studies
 of both rural and urban credit markets make clear.47 Monetary manip-
 ulations could disturb not just this intersectoral credit market but the
 land-rental market as well. It is conceivable, for example, that monetary
 manipulations prolonged the use of share contracts and in-kind pay-
 ments in French leases. As for the intersectoral credit market, the
 consequences of royal policy were severe. Indeed, the monarchy's
 actions tended to segment the long-term capital markets into separate
 geographical spheres and limit rural access to urban capital. The reason
 was that loans made to rural borrowers were small, with interest rates
 exceeding those on loans to city dwellers. The 5 percent limit on rural
 rentes was too low, given the transaction costs that urban lenders would
 assume in monitoring a host of small-scale rural borrowers. It would be
 more profitable to place the same entire sum in a single loan made to a
 great aristocrat, who could offer better collateral to boot. To be sure, the
 flow of capital into the countryside was a small fraction of the urban
 credit volume, and ex-post redistribution in the intersectoral capital
 market was therefore limited. Yet the limit here was an equilibrium
 phenomenon, a result of the intervention of the Crown.
 The Law Affair
 After the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 and the death of Louis XIV two
 years later, France urgently needed fiscal reform. The economy was
 drowning in the wake of decades of war. Fear of further devaluation
 encouraged hoarding. The monarchy proclaimed a visa and a chambre
 de justice, but they brought no fiscal relief. In desperation, the regent
 46 Compare Hoffman, "Taxes."
 47 Rosenthal, "Credit Markets."
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 (the duc d'Orleans, who ruled for the infant Louis XV) turned to John
 Law. In 1717 Law gained the right to refashion royal finance via a bank
 and a trading company that held a monopoly over essential parts of
 foreign trade. Although the trading company has received considerable
 attention, for long-term credit markets it is Law's bank that is most
 important. Almost immediately Law began to print bank notes (Billets
 de Banque) that were legal tender for taxes, though not for private
 transactions. In the fall of 1719 he waded into a murky scheme to
 consolidate the debt and put France on paper currency. By October
 1720 his empire had collapsed. In its wreckage, scores of private loans
 had been renegotiated, with outstanding private-debt levels sinking 30
 percent (Figure 1). On the public side, the regent took full advantage of
 the situation, reducing long-term debts by half and short-term debt even
 more.
 Law's plan had been to consolidate the royal debt into shares of his
 trading company; the shares would return 2 percent interest, and the
 Crown would pay him 3 percent. Because the crown paid 4 percent or
 more on its debt, everyone would profit, except of course the owners of
 the state's rentes. To make the scheme work, Law wanted to lower
 interest rates to 2 percent and then forcibly convert the government debt
 into shares of his company. With the shares paying a fixed dividend of
 200 livres, Law needed to lift their price to 10,000 livres. He took a
 number of different steps to boost the value of the outstanding shares
 artificially. He also inflated the money supply, making the bank notes of
 his Banque Royale legal tender in October of 1719. Because he issued
 the bank notes rapidly, their value plummeted.48
 The collapse of the bank notes' real value opened the door to frenetic
 renegotiation among private borrowers and lenders. With rentes and
 obligations denominated in money of account and bank notes legal
 tender, creditors had to accept the bank notes in repayment. Many a
 borrower took advantage of the situation to pay off his debts in Law's
 depreciated currency. But that was not the only result of Law's scheme.
 Holders of bank notes with no outstanding debts were eager to lend
 them out at low rates of interest. They were gambling that Law's notes
 would be retired soon and that contracts denominated in livres would
 have to be paid in full after stabilization. As a result, interest rates did
 indeed fall in 1719 and 1720, and redistribution in the private market
 ended up taking several forms: borrowers paid off old debts in depre-
 ciated paper; holders of bank notes lent them out at low interest rates,
 often so that a borrower could repay old debts; and finally, creditors
 granted a reduction in the interest payments to avoid repayment in
 48 What Law's reasoning was remains unclear; ongoing research on Law by Antoine Murphy will
 undoubtedly clarify matters.
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 depreciated paper. The incentive to reduce indebtedness was so great
 that in all likelihood few creditors were spared.
 Creditors found no shelter in the personal links that girded up the
 private credit market. Indeed, lenders bound to a borrower by ties of
 family, neighborhood, or profession were only slightly less likely to
 suffer repayment in the 13 months between October 1719 and October
 1720. Some lenders, such as widows and other women, fared quite
 poorly. Their incomes plunged. Perhaps one group thrived-large
 borrowers. They profited from the interest-rate spread that prevailed
 during the Law affair, some of them even borrowing at 1 percent. The
 low interest rate was available almost exclusively on enormous loans,
 making the extent of redistribution dependent on the loan size (Table 1).
 Rational Expectations and Participation
 The redistribution France experienced frightened its victims. Surely,
 they sought to flee its grip, for redistribution took the most when it
 seized its victims unawares or when its clutch could not be escaped. Yet
 here we have a conundrum. If redistribution was to be avoided, why did
 Old Regime elites voluntarily enter private and public credit markets?
 Given the Crown's history, were they not asking to be fleeced?
 The conundrum can be resolved if we separate Louis XIV's reign
 from what happened thereafter. Although significant under Louis XIV,
 redistribution was never overwhelming. The losses in his reign never
 exceeded 13 percent of the capital value of private outstanding debts
 during currency manipulations and 20 percent of the value of any given
 long-term public debt issue during defaults.49 Because redistribution
 was limited and fairly regular, lenders could calculate a risk premium
 that compensated them for their expected losses. The risk premium
 permitted them to enter the credit market voluntarily.
 The risk premium did not protect them, however, against the drastic
 measures that followed Louis XIV's reign. From Louis XIV's death
 through the Law affair, the losses were of a different magnitude and
 clearly unanticipated. The experience with paper currency was unlike
 anything in the past, causing private indebtedness to tumble by an
 unparalleled proportion. It is no surprise that the financial system took
 years to recover.
 GROWTH IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
 Why then did the supply of long-term private capital finally expand?
 What was different after 1730? We can only sketch the answer here, but
 it was clearly not a change in the laws about credit. No new instruments
 49 Those figures were attained in 1694 for private outstanding debts, when the value of the livre
 was brutally reduced, and for public debt in 1698-1700, when the interest rate on a government debt
 issue of 1697 was lowered from 1/14 to 1/20.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 20:01:17 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Long-Term Private Debt in Paris, 1660-1726 279
 appeared in the long-term private credit market, and the only legal
 contracts remained the rentes and obligations.50 Nor was it the sudden
 creation of a mortgage registry or of banks making long-term loans.
 Did politics unshackle the supply of private credit? Louis XIV was
 dead, but the Old Regime had not drastically changed. The state still
 defaulted, and whether the defaults grew rarer depends on the precise
 definition-a difficult issue both in economic theory and in historical
 practice.51 Yet the nature of the defaults did seem to change. Though
 still selective, they depended less on personal politics and were thus
 probably easier to anticipate. After the period 1716 to 1717, for instance,
 the Crown never summoned another chambre de justice, the harshest
 tool for singling out particularfinanciers. The most important political
 change, though, was that currency manipulation had come to an end:
 there were no more devaluations until the Revolution.52 One can debate
 whether contemporaries actually believed that the threat to the cur-
 rency had receded. Evidence that they did so comes from political
 thought, which likened currency manipulation to tyranny in the after-
 math of the Law affair.53 That at least is proof of public awareness and
 a sign that the political costs of currency manipulation would be steeper
 than in the past. When similar thoughts found support in the powerful
 sovereign law courts-the Parlements-lenders had all the more reason
 to feel reassured, and they could open their purses wider than ever
 before.S4
 The monarchy may thus have attained enough credibility to coax
 more money from lenders. Beyond that political change, there was also
 an institutional difference that helps explain the surge of long-term
 private credit: the growing role of notaries in the financial market.
 Although notaries were not bankers, they did serve to match borrowers
 and lenders.55 They were skilled intermediaries in a country that lacked
 banks. In the eighteenth century there is both qualitative and quantita-
 tive evidence that arranging loans was a major part of their business. In
 1742 it was said that the Parisian notaries were the "holders of the purse
 strings," the "information gatherers for lenders," who determined
 where investors placed their money. By the 1780s, the writer Louis-
 50 It is true that the obligations were employed in new ways, but the use of rentes and obligations
 had changed in the past as well, notably in the sixteenth century. See Schnapper, Rentes; Hoffman
 et al., "Private Credit Markets" and "Economie." We have also glossed over privately issued life
 annuities, but they had long existed and unlike public life annuities were a minor matter.
 51 Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz, "Pure Theory." For the difficulties of defining defaults or
 bankruptcies historically, contrast Bonney, Kings' Debts and Dessert, Argent.
 52 Calonne did change the gold-silver exchange rate in 1785, but the value of the livre in silver
 remained the same.
 53 Norberg, "Fiscal Crises," pp. 276-82; and Kaiser, "Money."
 54 Norberg, "Fiscal Crises," pp. 280-82; and Potter and Rosenthal, "Evolution."
 55 Legally, one of the essential functions of banks was off limits to notaries, for they were not
 supposed to pool money taken on deposit. Some did however-a topic we will take up in future
 research.
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 Sebastien Mercier could exclaim that the notaries had become "spec-
 ulators, movers of money" who sought out nothing less than "every
 possible way to borrow here and to lend there. They are involved in all
 loans of any size."56
 What the notaries did was to ease the task of borrowers and lenders.
 They released credit from the personal ties to which lending had been
 condemned by fears about collateral. From their work drafting probate
 records and other contracts, the notaries knew who had money to lend
 and who had secure collateral. They could put the borrowers and
 lenders together. Initially their matchmaking may have simply been an
 endogenous response to the rise in lending, but by providing a more
 impersonal solution to the problem of collateral, they lifted the credit
 market higher than it ever would have climbed on its own. They too
 helped create a secure atmosphere for lending.
 At other times and in other places, different intermediaries played a
 similar role, but in France it was the notaries, perhaps by historical
 accident. They had survived the Law affair and even profited from it by
 drafting thousands of acts during the frenzy of borrowing and repay-
 ment. They thus acquired further information about potential clients. In
 the absence of banks, they began to match borrowers and lenders, and
 as they did so, personal ties between debtor and creditor gradually
 declined in importance (Figure 4).57 And as resurgent credit came to
 dominate their activity, the value of their businesses rose.
 The change was not instantaneous. The Law affair was no French
 Revolution, suddenly ushering in a new world of private credit. It took
 time for notaries to hone their skills in the private credit market. It took
 time for private lenders to shed their fears of currency manipulation and
 other attacks by the Crown. And it took time for other political
 actors-notably the Parlements-to wield the muscle and forge the
 ideological chains that could restrain the Crown's predatory inclina-
 tions.
 56 Archives Ddpartementales de la C6te d'Or (Dijon), C4565 (15 September 1742); Mercier,
 Tableau, pp. 31-35. For additional quantitative and qualitative evidence, see Hoffman et al.,
 "Private Credit Markets," "Economie," and especially "What Do Notaries Do?"
 57Another sign of their new role was the fact that lenders no longer came disproportionately from
 their notary's neighborhood. His practice was no longer confined to his neighborhood or to simply
 recording business deals arranged by neighbors.
 Appendix
 The procedure that starts with raw monthly totals and arrives at estimates of the
 outstanding debt is lengthy and potentially quite sensitive to the inflation process. At all
 times we have tried to keep the methods as simple as possible. This concern was in part
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 driven by the limitations of the data, and in part by our desire to avoid exogenous
 information in constructing our series.
 CREDIT ACTIVITY COUNTS
 We began by collecting monthly counts of various credit acts from the indices
 contained in the Archives Nationales of ten different notarial etudes: numbers IX, XXI,
 XXVII, XLIII, LXII, LXX, LXXVIII, CXI, CXV, and CXVII. Because one of the
 etudes, number CXVII, contained the records of two notaries before 1744, we followed
 both notaries back to 1662. There were occasional gaps in the records of an individual
 notary, and for the period up to 1690 (when the most gaps occur) we filled the gaps by
 gathering data from two additional etudes: numbers XLIX and LXXII. To correct for
 missing data we assumed all notaries were equivalent and simply inflated or deflated our
 totals to obtain 10 standard notaries. Thus if 12 notaries were present we divided our
 totals by 1.2. More sophisticated approaches had no significant impact on the series.
 CREDIT VOLUMES
 To arrive at volume estimates we assembled large samples of loan sizes for our
 notaries in the years 1662, 1670, 1682, 1700, 1715, 1718 to 1720, 1725, 1740, 1760, 1780,
 and 1788. In addition we compiled information on public debt issues in 1682, 1711, and
 the 1770s. The samples yielded mean values for the size of each type of loan. We then
 multiplied these means by the monthly counts to derive credit volumes. Between the
 years when we sampled loan sizes, we simply imputed mean loan sizes by simple
 interpolation. At first glance, this straightforward method might appear to lead to
 significant bias, especially if loan sizes were correlated with the number of contracts.
 But in the nineteenth century it is possible to check the magnitude of the potential bias,
 for the notarial indices nearly always mention the actual amount of each loan.
 Fortunately, our method never led to an aggregate error in excess of 5 percent.58 We
 thus feel quite confident that our volume estimate accurately reflects our notaries'
 activity.
 Beyond mean loan sizes we made two additional corrections. First, we accounted for
 variation in the value of the French money of account (the livre), by converting it to a
 livre of constant silver weight. Unless stated otherwise, in all our series the livres are
 thus corrected to one worth 4.45 grams of silver. For 1718, 1719, and 1720, when the
 silver value of the livre is suspect, we relied on French-British and French-Dutch
 exchange rates to make our correction: the procedure used the ratio of the exchange rate
 in June of the given year to the rate in January 1718. Since neither the British pound nor
 the Dutch guilder suffered devaluations, most of the difference lay in the decline in the
 value of the French billet de Banque. In the years 1718 to 1720 we also reduced activity
 levels in rentes to take into account lower interest rates. The credit volumes for the
 period 1718 to 1720 are thus deflated first by an estimate of the value of the livre and then
 by the ratio of the interest rate to 5 percent.
 Because lending varied greatly from notary to notary, we gathered extensive cross
 sectional samples of credit activity for 30 additional notaries in 1670, 1700, 1725, 1751,
 and 1780. From these samples, we used the private activity indicators-the most stable
 part of credit activity-to derive inflation coefficients. These coefficients allow us to
 extrapolate from our sample of 12 notaries and estimate totals for all 114 notaries active
 in Paris during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since the cross sections of 30
 notaries provide information on 35 percent of all notaries we are quite confident that
 further sampling would yield little extra information. We can actually confirm that
 58 Obviously for any given notary the error can be much larger; but this is precisely why we
 collected information from a large sample.
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 assumption for at least one year-1751-thanks to a special index of all notarial activity
 in that year compiled by the Archives Nationales.
 FORWARD STOCKS
 Although activity counts and volume series are in themselves quite valuable, we
 needed to aggregate our data further. The problem was that the three loan contracts-
 the perpetual annuity, the life annuity, and the obligation-were all quite different. In
 particular, they all had different durations. We wanted an indicator that would reflect
 these differences. We began with a forward stock aggregate, where we simply weighted
 the volume series for each type of credit contract by the mean duration of that type of
 loan. Thus a perpetual annuity in the mid-eighteenth century with a mean duration of 12
 years received a weight six times larger than an obligation with a duration of two years.
 The forward stock revealed how willing lenders were to participate in long-term credit.
 But it gave little information about outstanding debt levels, unless one assumed that the
 market was in a steady state-an assumption that our series roundly rejected.
 OUTSTANDING DEBTS
 We then turned to estimating outstanding debt levels. Again we defined a simple
 procedure. Because all stock series require a starting value, we simply took the forward
 stock for our initial year. Since the market was remarkably steady in the 1660s,
 variations in the starting value had little bearing on the series. We also needed a
 procedure to remove repaid debts. If the demography of debt was simple then the
 inverse of the duration (1 I d) would give a fair estimate of what was repaid in each
 year.56 But debts, like human lives, face periodic epidemics that cut short their duration.
 To account for such drastic events, we relied on variations in the rate of quittances, or
 repayment contracts, in our notarial sample. Unfortunately, the quittances were not a
 perfect indicator of credit repayment. Many quittances did not involve credit but rather
 sales, inheritances, or past business associations. Nor did all credit repayments give rise
 to a quittance, for a creditor could simply return the parchment original to the borrower
 after having signed it as repaid. Nonetheless, we believed that variation in quittance
 rates did reflect variation in credit repayment rates, so we inflated our repayment series
 by the ratio of current quittances count (Qt) to a moving average of quittances (Q*t). The
 repayment rates are thus of the form (Qt / dQ*t).
 We ended up by computing three different outstanding debt series (ODS). We began
 with a nominal ODS, ignoring the effects of variations in the value of the livre. We also
 computed historical ODS, where we only took into account the variation of the livre
 when calculating additions to the credit stock. Third, we computed real ODS, where in
 each year the outstanding stock is valued at the current value of the livre. Nominal ODS
 is the financial equivalent of capital stock measured without regard for price variation,
 as one might compute from pure quantity indicators. Historical ODS is the financial
 equivalent of capital stock valued at historical cost, and real ODS is like a capital stock
 series where the capital is evaluated at market value in every period.
 9 We established durations in our cross sections.
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